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MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS 
W. Hamilton Bryson* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, the legal profession has had rules of profes-
sional conduct. Although they were unwritten, they were well 
known. The rules covered honesty in pleading and practice and 
also required the general politeness expected of decent people. 
These rules were not always followed, nor were they always 
enforced when not followed. Sadly, in modern times, these rules 
are being disregarded more frequently and the costs to others, 
both within and outside the profession, are increasing dramati-
cally. 
This deplorable situation has caught the attention of the 
organized bar, and codes of professional civility1 have been 
issued in recent times. The Virginia State Bar has an elaborate 
system for prosecuting professional misconduct.2 Though the 
system is operating aggressively, it has been effective in cur-
tailing only the most gross and obvious offenses. The traditional 
remedies-contempt of court proceedings and actions for mali-
cious prosecution-also have their limitations. In order to deal 
with the unprofessional behavior that was recognized by the 
bar but not adequately dealt with, the General Assembly, in 
1987, enacted Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1, which was 
closely modeled upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure No. 11.3 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. 
1. American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct, 156 F.R.D. 275-93 
(1994); VmGINJA STATE BAR, Principles of Professional Courtesy (June 1988); RICH-
MOND BAR AsSOCIATION, Principles of Professionalism, Bar Association of the City of 
Richmond Handbook, 8.1 (1994); Virginia Bar Association Creed, 22 VA. B. Ass'N J., 
Spring 1996, at 47. 
2. VmGINJA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiiLITY, VA. SUP. CT. R., 6, §§ II, 
IV, 13. 
3. Recent amendments to Federal Rule 11 have not been followed in Virginia 
state practice. 
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The purpose of this essay is to describe the application of sec-
tion 8.01-271.1 in practice. 
II. SUBSTANCE 
The essence of section 8.01-271.1 is that pleadings, motions, 
and other papers first should be "well grounded in fact and ... 
law" upon a "reasonable inquiry" and, second, should not be 
made "for any improper purpose. "4 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has declared that the first part of the rule is to be gov-
erned by an objective standard of reasonableness.5 The second 
part has not yet been considered by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, but the trial courts are applying a subjective test, which 
appears to this writer to be required by the words "improper 
purpose"6-a purpose or intention to do something that is im-
proper is an act of bad faith. 7 
A. "Reasonable Inquiry" 
If a filing or motion is to be judged by an objective stan-
dard-that of the reasonable lawyer, rather than the subjective 
view of the actual person who made the filing or motion-then 
the appellate court can reconsider the issue on appeal based on 
the record of the proceedings below. The appellate court can 
objectively determine the reasonableness of the lawyer just as 
well as the trial court. And indeed, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has felt unconstrained by the findings of the circuit courts 
4. Section 8.01-271.1 covers discovery requests and responses. E.g. Mickle v. 
Largent's Great Falls Stables, 34 Va. Cir. 143, 148, 150 (Fairfax County 1994); 
Thompson v. Adamson, 33 Va. Cir. 275 (Loudoun County 1994); Mayfield v. Southern 
Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229, 235 (Richmond City 1993); Athas v. Kolbe Corp., 24 Va. Cir. 
313 (Richmond City 1991); Wierzbicki v. Shirley, 17 Va. Cir. 192, 194 (Fairfax County 
1989). However, in order to remove any doubt, VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(g), which copies 
the language of § 8.01-271.1, was promulgated in 1991. Rule 4:1(g) sanctions were 
applied in Lewis v. Lambert, 26 Va. Cir. 109 (Richmond City 1991). The sanctions of 
§ 8.01-271.1 can also be applied in situations of bad faith attachments and memoran-
da of lis pendens under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-269. E.g., CMF Loudoun, L.P. v. 
Brown, 39 Va. Cir. 101, 103 (Loudoun County 1996). 
5. See infra Sect. II.A. 
6. See infra Sect. II.B. 
7. See, e.g., Atlas Mach. & Iron Works Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 986 F.2d 
709, 716 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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in reconsidering the state of the law and the pleader's knowl-
edge of the facts in reversing lower court decisions. 
In the case of Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors of Augusta 
County,8 the standard of objective reasonableness was applied 
by the circuit court to the plaintiffs motion for judgment.9 The 
plaintiff, an attorney at law suing pro se as a private citizen of 
Augusta County, sued the Board of Supervisors to prevent them 
from moving the county offices out of the City of Staunton. 
There were several political and economic considerations on 
both sides of the issue; there was no impropriety, but the gen-
eral public was well aware of the issues of civic pride and fi-
nancial cost of moving the county offices. Hence, public opinion 
was sharply divided. 
The circuit court found that the plaintiff was motivated by 
"sincerity," but his legal conclusions were "unreasonable."10 
The law requires a referendum before moving the county court 
house but not before moving the county administrative offices. 
The argument to the contrary based on a seat of government 
theory was found to be objectively unreasonable. The circuit 
court judge then held that "subjective notions of good faith are 
significant ... [but] not relevant ... " as to whether there 
should be sanctions under section 8.01-271.1, and held that he 
was required to impose a sanction.11 However, the good faith 
of the plaintiff was relevant to what the sanction should be, 
and the plaintiff was given a "private reprimand."12 Presum-
ably, it was such a "private reprimand" as might be imposed by 
a disciplinary committee of the Virginia State Bar upon a mem-
ber of the bar. A private scolding of a member of the general 
public in a judge's chambers would be less severe than the 
scowls meted out in public daily by many a general district 
court judge for a person's having been arrested though acquit-
ted. 
8. 15 Va. Cir. 134 (Augusta County 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 239 Va. 611, 
391 S.E.2d 288 (1990). 
9. Id. at 138. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 139. 
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed this ruling on the 
grounds that as a matter of law the plaintiffs position was 
reasonable though erroneous. 13 In fact, the supreme court had 
recently refused to hear an appeal of Tullidge's case in chief 
and thus in effect affirmed the dismissal of his case by the cir-
cuit court.14 Whether a legal argument is reasonable though 
erroneous is as much a question of law for review on appeal as 
the correctness of the argument. The effect of this position upon 
the well established principle ignorantia legis neminem excusat 
is unclear. 
Decided on the same day as Tullidge was County of Prince 
William v. Rau.15 In this case, Rau sued for a declaratory 
judgment against Prince William County to have a rezoning 
ordinance declared invalid for the failure to follow correct par-
liamentary procedures.16 The final rezoning vote came after a 
series of substitute motions, tie votes, deferments, and 
reconsiderations. 17 The circuit court ruled that technically the 
rezoning was invalid, and imposed sanctions under section 8.01-
271.1 against Prince William County in the amount of the 
plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the suit.18 
The case involved a complicated interplay of the laws and rules 
of municipal corporations and parliamentary procedure. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia, following Tullidge, reversed the award 
of sanctions against the County because its defense to the liti-
gation was reasonable, though ultimately unsuccessful.19 Ap-
plying Tullidge, the supreme court said that "[w]e ... resolve 
any doubts in favor of the [person sought to be sanctioned] and 
eschew the wisdom of hindsight. "20 
In Montecalvo v. Johnson,21 an arrest warrant was issued 
against Montecalvo, but the criminal charges against him were 
dismissed. Montecalvo then sued Johnson and others for mali-
13. Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors of Augusta County, 239 Va. 611, 391 S.E.2d 
288 (1990). 
14. Id. at 614, 391 S.E.2d at 289. 
15. 239 Va. 616, 391 S.E.2d 290 (1990). 
16. Id. at 618, 391 S.E.2d at 291. 
17. Id. at 618-20, 391 S.E.2d at 291-92. 
18. Id. at 618, 391 S.E.2d at 291. 
19. Id. at 620-21, 391 S.E.2d at 292-93. 
20. Id. at 620, 391 S.E.2d at 292. 
21. 17 Va. Cir. 382 (Richmond City 1989). 
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cious prosecution. Johnson's attorney gave detailed information 
to Montecalvo's attorney showing that Johnson had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the issuance of the warrant and that the 
claim was thus completely groundless. Neither the plaintiff nor 
his attorney took any steps to dismiss the claim or even investi-
gate the merits of the action. lp. Montecalvo, the filing was done 
"without any investigation" of the facts except for the informa-
tion found in the arrest warrant. Afterwards, having been in-
formed of the truth of the matter by defense counsel, no inves-
tigation or discovery whatsoever was conducted as to the facts. 
Applying an objective standard of reasonableness, the trial 
court judge granted a motion for sanctions against the 
plaintiffs lawyer and ordered him to reimburse the defendant 
for her own attorney's reasonable fees.22 The trial court ruled 
that though such sanctions are not favored, they were neces-
sary "to prevent frivolous lawsuits."23 In this case, the trial 
court found that the filing of this lawsuit without any investi-
gation of the facts was done with the intent to harass.24 The 
trial court further held that the purposes of section 8.01-271.1 
are to deter improper litigation and to give compensation for 
it.25 
In a four to three decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in 
the case of Oxenham v. Johnson,26 reversed the trial court's 
order for sanctions. The supreme court stated, as a standard of 
review, that an award or denial of sanctions would be reversed 
only for an abuse of judicial discretion on the part of the trial 
judge.27 The supreme court substantially agreed with the objec-
tive principles applied by the circuit court. The purposes of 
section 8.01-271.1 are to "protect litigants from the mental 
anguish and expense of frivolous assertions of unfounded factu-
al and legal claims and against the assertion of valid claims for 
improper purposes. And, sanctions can be used to protect courts 
against those who would abuse the judicial process."28 
22. ld. at 384, 386. 
23. ld. at 385. 
24. Id. at 384. 
25. ld. at 385. 
26. 241 Va. 281, 402 S.E.2d 1 (1991). 
27. Id. at 287, 402 S.E.2d at 4. 
28. Id. at 286, 402 S.E.2d at 3. 
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However, based on the facts of Montecalvo u. Johnson, the 
majority of the supreme court ruled that the plruntifi's claim for 
compensatory damages was clearly not frivolous and that it 
clearly was not an attempt to improperly harass the defen-
dant.29 Therefore, the trial court judge abused his discretion in 
ordering sanctions, and he was reversed.30 The majority ac-
knowledged that Montecalvo's claim for punitive damages was 
indeed frivolous, and this would have appeared to the plaintiffs 
counsel had he made a reasonable inquiry into the facts. 31 
However, the trial court had not separated the expense of de-
fending against the frivolous claim for punitive damages from 
the legitimate claim for compensatory damages.32 Thus, the 
improper calculation of damages was an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. 33 Since the supreme court could not make the 
correct calculation without hearing further evidence-which, of 
course, is not proper upon an appeal-the lower court order 
was reversed. Rather than remand the case for this to be done 
in the lower court, the supreme court entered final judgment of 
dismissal in favor of the appellant. 
A strong dissenting opinion filed by three of the justices of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia followed. 34 The essence of the 
dissent was that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that the entire claim in the circuit court was filed im-
properly.35 Thus, the sanctions were fully appropriate. 
The minority opinion also volunteered some useful and in-
structive dictum. Weak legal claims that are filed in anticipa-
tion of small out-of-court settlements are liable to receive sanc-
tions. 36 This suggests that the willingness to settle for the 
"nuisance value," (i.e., a sum less than the defendant's antici-
pated litigation expenses) is an invitation to a claim for sane-
29. Id. at 287-89, 402 S.E.2d at 4-5. 
30. Id. at 290, 402 S.E.2d at 6. 
31. Id. at 289, 402 S.E.2d at 5-6. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 290, 402 S.E.2d at 6. 
34. Id. at 290-99, 402 S.E.2d at 6-11 (Poff, S.J. joined by Russell, J., and Hassell, 
J., dissenting). 
35. See id. at 297-99, 402 S.E.2d at 9-11 (Poff, S.J., joined by Russell, J. and 
Hassell, J. dissenting). 
36. Id. at 297, 402 S.E.2d at 10 (Poff, S.J., joined by Russell, J. and Hassell, J. 
dissenting). 
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tions under section 8.01-271.1.37 The minority oprmon of the 
court also declared that one purpose of the statute is to com-
pensate for damage, (i.e., expenses) caused by improper litiga-
tion.38 
Another case in which the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed substantive issues raised pursuant to section 8.01-271.1 
is Nedrich v. Jones.39 The trial court found in favor of the six-
teen defendants, sustained their demurrers, and awarded sanc-
tions against the plaintiffs attorney.40 On appeal, the supreme 
court held that some of the plaintiffs claims were plausible and 
objectively reasonable but that others were not, and therefore, 
the awards of sanctions were affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.41 
In the case of Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County v. 
County of Brunswick, 42 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed 
an award of sanctions by the Circuit Court of Brunswick Coun-
ty. One of the counts of the plaintiffs' suit was to have certain 
individual members of the Board of Supervisors held personally 
liable for certain official acts for which they voted.43 The trial 
court held that there was no law that could be reasonably con-
strued to allow such a claim, and imposed sanctions.44 The 
supreme court affirmed this award of sanctions.45 
Little can be inferred from the statistical observation that in 
most of the cases involving section 8.01-271.1, the supreme 
court has reversed the award of sanctions. First, an appellate 
court is more likely to write an opinion when it reverses rather 
37. Id. (Poff, S.J., joined by Russell, J. and Hassel, J., dissenting). Whether a 
clause in a settlement agreement not to pursue remedies under § 8.01-271.1 would be 
void as against public policy depends upon whether this statute is penal or quasi-
penal. This writer believes that it is quasi-penal since one of its purposes is "to pro-
tect courts against those who would abuse the judicial process." Id. at 286, 402 
S.E.2d at 3. A statute that protects the public is at least quasi-penal. In Mayfield v. 
Southern Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229, 237 (Richmond City 1993), the court granted sanctions 
to "punish the plaintiff for his dishonesty." 
38. Oxenham, 241 Va. at 298, 402 S.E.2d at 10. 
39. 245 Va. 465, 429 S.E.2d 201 (1993). 
40. Id. at 470, 429 S.E.2d at 203. 
41. Id. at 471-77, 429 S.E.2d at 204-07. 
42. 249 Va. 320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995). 
43. Id. at 329, 455 S.E.2d at 717. 
44. Id. at 333, 455 S.E.2d at 719. 
45. Id. at 334, 455 S.E.2d at 720. 
1516 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1509 
than affirms a lower court's award of sanctions; there is a 
greater psychological need to explain the reasons for disagree-
ing than agreeing with something. Secondly, the supreme court 
is less likely to grant an appeal in the first place where the 
trial court has, by means of a letter opinion or otherwise, justi-
fied its action and the appellate court sees the correctness of it. 
On the other hand, a trial court would be more likely to write 
an opinion when it sustains a motion for sanctions. In fact, 
most such motions are dismissed peremptorily.46 
In Bandas v. Bandas/7 the divorcing parties contracted to 
submit their differences to arbitration. After the arbitrator 
made an award that was favorable to the plaintiff-wife, she 
moved for the court to confirm the award and make it an order 
of the court.46 The defendant-husband opposed the motion on 
the grounds that the contract for arbitration of support, child 
visitation, and equitable distribution was against public policy 
and was erroneous in various respects. 49 "[T]he court found 
there was no basis whatever to question the arbitrator's deci-
sions. . . . There was no plausible view of the law available to 
defendant .... "50 The objections of the defendant were found 
to be "frivolous causing consequent unnecessary delay and ex-
pense to plaintiff," and sanctions were imposed.51 
In 1993, the Court of Appeals of Virginia heard the 
husband's appeal from the circuit court decision.52 Applying 
the "abuse of discretion" standard, the court of appeals found 
that the trial court ruled correctly in awarding sanctions based 
on allegations by the husband as to the propriety of the arbi-
tration award.53 Nevertheless, the court of appeals remanded 
the award to the trial court to reconsider the question of "how 
46. E.g., Chavez v. Metaxatos, 28 Va. Cir. 239, 239 (Alexandria City 1992); Conti-
nental Fed. Sav. Bank v. Centennial Dev. Corp., 23 Va. Cir. 275, 277 (Fairfax County 
1991) ("the filing was objectively reasonable"); Sterrett v. Loudoun County Supervi-
sors, 23 Va. Cir. 153, 161 (Loudoun County 1991); Sovran Bank, N.A v. Jacob, 15 
Va. Cir. 110, 123 (Loudoun County 1988); Vaughn v. McGrew, 12 Va. Cir. 125, 126 
(Chesapeake City 1988). 
47. 25 Va. Cir. 492 (Richmond City 1991). 
48. Id. at 492. 
49. Id. at 492-96. 
50. Id. at 510. 
51. Id. 
52. Bandas v. Bandas, 16 Va. App. 427, 430 S.E.2d 706 (1993). 
53. Id. at 438, 430 S.E.2d at 712. 
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an arbitration award should be treated by a trial court in do-
mestic relations cases."54 Therefore, the court of appeals re-
manded the case ordering the amount of the sanctions to be 
recalculated. 55 
Numerous reported circuit court cases granted sanctions for 
filings and motions that were not reasonably grounded on law 
or facts.56 Additionally, there are numerous cases in which mo-
tions for sanctions have been denied. 57 
B. "Improper Purpose" 
Turning now to the second general prohibition, that of filing 
pleadings and making motions "for any improper purpose," we 
see that section 8.01-271.1 deals with actions that may be legal-
ly correct, but that are abusive under the circumstances.58 Im-
proper actions within the context of litigation are prohibited. 
The Statute gives three examples of improper purposes, "to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase . . . 
the cost of litigation."59 This goes considerably beyond the ele-
ments of the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of pro-
cess. Although the appellate courts in Virginia have not yet had 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. E.g., Mickle v. Largent's Great Falls Stables, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 143 (Fairfax 
County 1994); Murphy v. Chadwyck-Healey, Inc., 31 Va. Cir. 163 (Alexandria City 
1993); Griffith v. Smith, 30 Va. Cir. 250 (Richmond City 1993), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Roberts v. Clarke, 34 Va. Cir. 61 (Va. 1994) (per curiam); Miiier v. Moore, 
29 Va. Cir. 339 (Fauquier County 1992); Friedman v. Fairfax Plaza Office Park, 29 
Va. Cir. 239 (Fairfax County 1992); Parten Paint and Drywall Co. v. WeiisiAshburn 
Venture, 29 Va. Cir. 117 (Loudoun County 1992); Coronis v. Flowers, 23 Va. Cir. 1 
(Fairfax County 1990); Wierzbicki v. Shirley, 17 Va. Cir. 192 (Fairfax County 1989); 
Sullivan v. Reliable Realty, 16 Va. Cir. 118 (Clarke County 1989). 
57. Smith v. Smith, 37 Va. Cir. 267 (Loudoun County 1995); Saliba v. Duff, 35 
Va. Cir. 141 (Fairfax County 1994); Lazarus v. Thomas, 33 Va. Cir. 457 (Loudoun 
County 1994); Lewis v. Dean, 28 Va. Cir. 319 (Fairfax County 1992); Continental 
F.S.B. v. Centennial Dev. Corp., 23 Va. Cir. 275 (Fairfax County 1991); Lankford v. 
Moore's Marine, Inc., 22 Va. Cir. 295 (Richmond City 1990); Frantz's Auto. Services, 
Inc. v. Crabtree, 21 Va. Cir. 443 (Fairfax County 1990); Ashmont Co. v. Welton, 20 
Va. Cir. 181 (Chesterfield County 1990); Bragg v. Bragg, 20 Va. Cir. 26 (Loudoun 
County 1989); Investors Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Foster, 19 Va. Cir. 111 (Richmond 
City 1990); Socorso v. Remuzzi, 17 Va. Cir. 94 (Loudoun County 1989). 
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl Vol 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996). 
59. Id. 
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an occasion to express an opinion on what is an "improper 
purpose" under the Statute, 60 there are numerous circuit court 
opinions. 
To begin with, sanctions do not lie against a plaintiff merely 
for exercising the right to suffer a voluntary nonsuit, 61 nor can 
sanctions be imposed under section 8.01-271.1 for the improper 
questioning of a witness at a deposition. 62 Furthermore, 
"[s]anctions are not appropriate merely because a party loses a 
motion or a case. Nor are sanctions appropriate because a de-
fense is ultimately unsuccessfu.l."63 
However, filing a suit for the purpose of tactical posturing is 
prohibited by section 8.01-271.1.64 Pursuing a frivolous claim 
against a person in the hopes of settling it out of court for the 
"nuisance value" of it is sanctionable. 65 False and groundless 
responses to discovery requests that needlessly increase the cost 
of litigation are subject to sanctions under this Statute, 66 as 
are actions "undertaken in bad faith with the intent to harass 
and obstruct."67 
A fortiori, actions taken in bad faith with actual malice and 
deceit are covered. In Dominion Leasing Corp. u. Thompson, 68 
60. There are a few appellate court opinions which consider what is not an "im-
proper purpose." See Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 289, 402 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1991); 
Wetstein v. Araujo-Wetstein, 11 Va. App. 331, 398 S.E.2d 96 (1990). However, this 
type of case is somewhat fact specific, and not much can be argued from a statement 
of a negative. 
61. Breckner v. Hallen, 36 Va. Cir. 79, 81 (Spotsylvania County 1995); Warf v. 
Fields, 33 Va. Cir. 1, 4 (Loudoun County 1993); Becon Services Corp. v. Hazel Indus., 
Inc., 33 Va. Cir. 554, 558 (Loudoun County 1992). 
62. Timchak v. Ogden Allied Services Corp., 24 Va. Cir. 70, 73-74 (Loudoun 
County 1991). 
63. Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 30 Va. Cir. 22, 34 (Fairfax 
County 1992). 
64. Griffith v. Smith, 30 Va. Cir. 250, 266-68 (Richmond City 1993) rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Roberts v. Clarke, 34 Va. Cir. 61 (Va. 1994); Dolan v. Barnes, 19 
Va. Cir. 76, 77 (Alexandria City 1989). 
65. Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 297, 402 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1991) (Poff, S.J., 
dissenting). 
66. Mickle v. Largent's Great Falls Stables, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 143, 148 (Fairfax 
County 1994); Thompson v. Adamson, 33 Va. Cir. 275 (Loudoun County 1994); see 
also Va. Sup. Ct. R. 4:1(g); Mayfield v. Southern Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229 (Richmond City 
1993). 
67. Liberty Sav. Bank v. Ben J. Powers Const., Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 527, 528 
(Fauquier County 1992). 
68. 15 Va. Cir. 446 (Roanoke City 1989) ("deceitful" and "outrageous and egre-
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a claim was filed which was barred by the doctrine of res judi-
cata and a contract to arbitrate. Also, the filing of the same 
claim in a federal court had resulted in sanctions under Federal 
Rule 11 (the model for section 8.01-271.1), and the same claim 
had been dismissed by a judge of the Superior Court for the 
District of Columbia. 69 
In Melka Marine, Inc. u. Town of Colonial Beach/0 the cir-
cuit court found that the plaintiff and his counsel deliberately 
and needlessly increased the cost of the litigation, and substan-
tial sanctions were awarded against the plaintiff and his coun-
sel for oppressive litigation tactics. 
In Bremner, Baber and Janus u. Morrissey,71 the defendant 
Michael J. Morrissey, a member of the bar, made "a blatant 
misrepresentation to the court, "72 sanctions were granted 
against him, and the matter was referred to the disciplinary 
committee of the Virginia State Bar. illtimately his license to 
practice law was revoked. 73 
Although pro se litigants are usually treated with tenderness 
by the courts/4 in Parr Excellence, Inc. u. Anderson/5 the pro 
se defendant's "egregious behavior" in attempting to have oppos-
ing counsel removed from the lawsuit resulted in an award of 
sanctions under section 8.01-271.1. The circuit court held that 
"[a] review of the record of this case, incidental litigation stem-
ming from this case, and prior practices of defendant in other 
cases reveals that the motion was interposed for the purposes 
of delay, harassment, frustration and escalation of costs of the 
opposition."76 This case, in fact, was part of an incredible cam-
paign of harassment by means of bad faith litigation which led 
gious violations"). 
69. Id. at 447. 
70. 37 Va. Cir. 108 (Westmoreland County 1995). 
71. 19 Va. Cir. 324 (Richmond City 1990). 
72. Id. at 329. In Mayfield v. Southern Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229 (Richmond City 
1993), sanctions were imposed to "punish this plaintiff for hiG dishonesty." Id. at 237. 
73. In re Morrissey, No. 90-031-1002, VA. LAw. REG., Apr. 1991, at 28-30, affd 
sub nom. Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar, No. 910738, VA. LAw. REG., Feb. 1993, at 
36. 
74. E.g., Socorso v. Remuzzi, 17 Va. Cir. 94, 96 (Loudoun County 1989); Berger v. 
Simsarian, 14 Va. Cir. 261 (Arlington County 1989). 
75. 14 Va. Cir. 10 (Fairfax County 1987). 
76. Id. at 14. 
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to Anderson's being denied access to the courts without prior 
judicial approval. 77 
This writer has heard it said often that section 8.01-271.1 is 
not needed because the bar of Virginia behaves with honesty 
and decency. This is for the most part true, and may it contin-
ue so. However, we have seen some sad cases to the contrary, 
and occasionally sanctions under this statute are needed and 
appropriate. 
C. "Appropriate Sanction" 
Virginia Code section 8.01-271.178 states that "an appropri-
ate sanction" can be imposed against an offending attorney79 
or partyB0 or both of them.81 The Statute does not limit the 
judge as to the scope of "an appropriate sanction" where one is 
found to be warranted.82 However, it does suggest an order to 
pay "reasonable expenses" and "reasonable attorney's fee[s]."83 
Indeed, these are the most obvious means of compensating for 
damage caused by improper litigation, and they are certainly 
the most frequent types of sanction.84 However, one circuit 
77. Anderson v. Sharma, 33 Va. Cir. 543, 549 (Fairfax County 1992). 
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996). 
79. E.g., Athas v. Kolbe Corp., 24 Va. Cir. 313, 319 (Richmond City 1991). 
80. E.g., Mayfield v. Southern Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229, 237 (Richmond City 1993). 
81. E.g., Melka Marine, Inc. v. Town of Colonial Beach, 37 Va. Cir. 108 
(Westmoreland County 1995); Wierzbicki v. Shirley, 17 Va. Cir. 192, 194 (Fairfax 
County 1989). 
82. See cases cited supra note 81. 
83. Id. 
84. E.g., O'Brien v. Wren, 39 Va. Cir. 222, 223 (Charlottesville City 1996) 
($6,000.00); Dove v. Dayton Town Council, 39 Va. Cir. 159, 171-72 (Rockingham 
County 1996) ($49,641.98); CMF Loudoun, L.P. v. Brown, 39 Va. Cir. 101, 104 
(Loudoun County 1996) ($2,000.00); Sozio v. Thorpe, 38 Va. Cir. 280 (Fairfax County 
1995) ($1,400.00); Pisner v. Wilson Tree Co., 38 Va. Cir. 74, 76-77 (Fairfax County 
1995) ($2,500.00); Melka Marine, Inc. v. Town of Colonial Beach, 37 Va. Cir. 108 
(Westmoreland County 1995) ($30,000.00 for attorney's fees); Mickle v. Largent's 
Great Falls Stables, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 143, 148 (Fairfax County 1994) ($4,082.20 for 
attorney's fees); Thompson v. Adamson, 33 Va. Cir. 275 (Loudoun County 1994) 
($3,196.99 for expenses for an unnecessary study); Liberty Sav. Bank v. Ben J. Pow-
ers Constr., Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 527, 528 (Fauquier County 1992) ($6,500.00 for 
attorney's and expert witness fees); Athas v. Kolbe Corp., 24 Va. Cir. 313, 319 (Rich-
mond City 1991) ($300.00 for attorney's fees); Coronis v. Flowers, 23 Va. Cir. 1, 3 
(Fairfax County 1990) ($300.00 for attorney's fees); Bremner, Baber and Janus v. 
Morrissey, 19 Va. Cir. 324, 331 (Richmond City 1990) ($973.70 for attorney's fees, 
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court gave a private reprimand as a sanction, 85 and another 
thought that an early dismissal of a non-meritorious claim was 
sufficient. 86 
Section 8.01-271.1 of the Virginia Code was not intended to 
routinely shift the attorney's fees of the prevailing party to the 
losing party. However, where a party is forced to pay an attor-
ney as a result of improper actions covered by this section, 
these additional attorney's fees are expenses that are properly 
compensable under the section. If an attorney is required to do 
work that was caused by a violation of this section, he or she 
should move for sanctions against the opposing party or counsel 
rather than pass the costs on to the client. 
The most frequent use of sanctions under section 8.01-271.1 
is to compensate for damages, i.e., additional expenses incurred 
as a result of violations of the standards of litigation imposed 
by this section.87 However, sanctions are also available to 
"punish" for dishonesty and to "send a clear message" of deter-
rence to others. 88 
III. PROCEDURE 
A Which Court 
Motions for sanctions under section 8.01-271.1 do not lie for 
improper actions taken in other courts or in other lawsuits. 89 
While a circuit court cannot award sanctions for papers filed in 
a general district court, 90 sanctions imposed by a district court 
court costs, and court reporter's fees). 
85. Tullidge v. Augusta County Supervisors, 15 Va. Cir. 134, 139 (Augusta County 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 239 Va. 611, 391 S.E.2d 288 (1990). The circuit court 
agreed that "the appropriate sanction is the least severe that will serve the purpose." 
15 Va. Cir. at 138. 
86. Berger v. Simsarian, 14 Va. Cir. 261 (Arlington County 1989). 
87. See supra footnote 84. 
88. Mayfield v. Southern Ry., 31 Va. Cir. 229, 237 (Richmond City 1993) ($10,000 
sanction imposed on the plaintift). 
89. Liberty Sav. Bank v. Ben J. Powers Constr., Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 527 (Fauquier 
County 1992). 
90. Walker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 26 Va. Cir. 95 (Richmond City 
1991) (motion was made in circuit court after case was removed from general district 
court). 
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can be appealed to the circuit court for a hearing de novo on 
the issue of sanctions. 91 And, of course, sanctions imposed by a 
circuit court are appealable to the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
or to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
B. Timeliness 
Section 8.01-271.1 cannot be applied retroactively to conduct 
that occurred before July 1, 1987, the date on which it went 
into effect.92 
This Statute does not create a new cause of action nor a 
claim or right separate from the substantive claims asserted by 
the parties, nor can an action for negligence be based upon 
it.93 Therefore, motions under section 8.01-271.1 must be made 
while the lawsuit is still under the jurisdiction of the trial court 
as defined by Rule 1:194 unless the court "expressly reserve[s] 
jurisdiction over the . . . motion for sanctions . . . ,gs in an or-
der. When this statute was first enacted, the circuit courts 
compared motions for sanctions to proceedings for contempt of 
court and held that the twenty-one day period of Rule 1:1 was 
not applicable.96 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
quickly ruled to the contrary.97 
91. Revell v. National Carpet & Rug, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 129 (Fredericksburg City 
1994). 
92. Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 382-83 
(1989), reu'g sub nom. Lee Conner Realty Corp. v. Lannon, 9 Va. Cir. 97 (Henrico 
County 1987); Arcola Indus. Park Joint Venture v. Bryant, 17 Va. Cir. 243 (Fairfax 
County 1989). 
93. Citizens for Fauquier County v. SPR Corp., 37 Va. Cir. 44 (Fauquier County 
1995) (nor can § 8.01-271.1 be the foundation for a claim of civil conspiracy); Remuzzi 
v. Giunta, 32 Va. Cir. 90 (Loudoun County 1993); Covington v. Haboush, 28 Va. Cir. 
360 (Richmond City 1992). 
94. "All final judgments ... shall remain under the control of the trial court ... 
for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1. 
95. Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County v. Brunswick County, 249 Va. 320, 
332, 455 S.E.2d 712, 719 (1995); see also Mickle v. Largent's Great Falls Stables, 
Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 143, 150 (Fairfax County 1994) ("Where the court officially separates 
the motion for sanctions from the case in chief .... "). 
96. Anderson v. Busman, 22 Va. Cir. 93 (Fairfax County 1990), reu'd, 26 Va. Cir. 
26 (Va. 1991); see also Community Bank & Trust v. Turk, 20 Va. Cir. 378 (Loudoun 
County 1990); Surovell, Jackson, Colten & Dugan, P.C. v. Dawson, 18 Va. Cir. 392 
(Fairfax County 1990). 
97. Anderson v. Busman, 26 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. 1991), reu'g 22 Va. Cir. 93 (Fairfax 
County 1990); see also Roberts v. Clarke, 34 Va. Cir. 61 (Va. 1994), reu'g Griffith v. 
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C. Preserving the Motion 
In order to avoid the limitation of Rule 1:1, the cautious and 
safe . method of proceeding is simply to postpone entry of the 
final judgment in the case until after all motions for sanctions 
have been heard and determined. This is the modus operandi of 
most circuit court judges. The disadvantage to this is postpon-
ing the resolution of the parties' controversy while matters 
involving counsel, not the parties, are being decided. For exam-
ple, in the case of Griffith v. Smith, 98 a demurrer and motion 
for sanctions were filed on March 15, 1991, a hearing was held 
on April 22, 1991, and the demurrer was sustained on May 13, 
1991; however, the issue of sanctions against the plaintiffs 
attorney was not decided until March 4, 1993, after extensive 
and careful research and further hearings. In order to accom-
modate the parties, the trial court judge took the motion for 
sanctions "under advisement" in order to avoid the operation of 
Rule 1:1 and then dismissed the defendant.99 
Taking the motion for sanctions under advisement was insuf-
ficient to avoid being reversed upon appeal.100 The trial court 
should have "officially separate[d] the motion for sanctions from 
the case in chief. . . . [by means of a] judgment order which 
expressly reserved determination of the motion."101 To put it 
another way, the trial court judge should have "expressly re-
served jurisdiction over the . . . motion for sanctions in the . . . 
order[] that preceded the final order .... "102 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The imposition of sanctions under section 8.01-271.1 for mis-
use of the legal process ultimately requires a balancing of con-
Smith, 30 Va. Cir. 250 (Richmond City 1993); Covington v. Haboush, 28 Va. Cir. 360 
(Richmond City 1992). 
98. 30 Va. Cir. 250 (Richmond City 1993). 
99. ld. at 251 n.l. 
100. Roberts v. Clarke, 34 Va. Cir. 61 (Va. 1994) (per curiam). 
101. Mickle v. Largent's Great Falls Stables, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 143, 150 (Fairfax 
County 1994). 
102. Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County v. Brunswick County, 249 Va. 320, 
332, 455 S.E. 2d 712, 719 (1995). 
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flicting general principles; this must be done by the trial court 
in its sound judicial discretion. In describing this balance, this 
writer cannot do better than to quote the scholarly Judge Rob-
ert K Woltz: 
In the court's oprmon, sanctions of this nature should be 
applied very cautiously. The right of litigants to seek re-
dress in the courts and the responsibility of counsel to seek 
redress for their clients by the joinder of multiple parties 
and by advancing legal theories of recovery, even at times 
novel theories, should not be stifled. On the other hand, 
such liberty granted to litigants and their lawyers should 
not be construed as open season to sue anyone and every-
one within sight or sound nor to give them license to assert 
legal theories with insubstantial factual underpinnings. 
Clearly, sanctions are not appropriate in every case merely 
because a demurrer has been sustained.103 
In Virginia state courts, many trial judges do not grant mo-
tions for sanctions as a matter of policy, and those that do 
proceed reluctantly and cautiously so as not to discourage the 
good faith resort to the courts. However, bad faith and negli-
gent litigation practices which cause harm are destructive to 
the system of justice as administered by the courts. Offenses 
against the principles of section 8.01-271.1 increase the costs of 
litigation and thus, adversely affect the accessibility of the 
courts to poor people and those who have small claims. This 
Statute has had the beneficial effect of causing lawyers to think 
through their claims, defenses, motions, and discovery methods 
before putting them into action. Certainly, thoughtful planning 
and legal research at the beginning of the process will result in 
more efficient and less expensive litigation. AB it is currently 
being applied in the Virginia state courts today, this Statute 
has been a success. 
103. Sullivan v. Reliable Realty, 16 Va. Cir. 118, 128 (Clarke County 1989) 
(awarding sanctions for indiscriminate claims against various defendants). 
